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Peace and Security in Africa 
Bask Structura~ Changes in the Governance of 
Peace and Security on the African Continent 
IBy IEdwarcll Shalala 
Introduction 
Six vears after Jane's Intelligence Review 
reported that there would be no bright dawn 
for the African continent, the "continent 
of conflict", and that Africa would be in 
for some very hard times, The Economist 
wrote on its leader page: "In fits and starts, 
Africa is getting more peaceful." The 
Ec0110mist concluded that while it would be 
a long time before Africa was truly stable, 
at least the continent was moving in the 
right direction.' While on a visit to Africa 
in 2005, Paul Wolfowitz, the newly-elected 
President of the World Bank, said that he 
felt that Africa was on the move and that it 
was going to move a lot faster. 2 He v..rent on 
to say that there was now a new leadership 
in Africa that was taking responsibility and 
that Africa may be at a turning point with 
wealthy stares showing more interest in 
helping to solve the continent's problems.' 
According to Wolfowirz, the international 
community was facing an ('extraordinary 
moment in history" in terms of its support 
for Africa:' 
2 
The fact that twenty African countries 
Economist. S January 2005: 11-11. 
''\\'o!fowitz singles our ~v1be.ki for praise", Business 
Report lntmwtion..I/, 20 June 2005: 23. 
.. Wolfowitz says Afric.t mar be at a turning point", 
Buswcss D.1y, 15 June 2005: 9; .. \V'o[fowitz single;; out 
Mbek1 .. .'': 23. 
"Wolfowitz \·is it seen as a sign of goodwi!l", Business 
Duy Africa, 20 June 2005: 12. 
were scheduled to hold presidential, 
parliamentary or local government elections 
in 2005 and the fact that three long-serving 
Southern African leaders, namely the 
Malawian President Bakali Muluzi, the 
Namibian President Sam Nujoma and the 
Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano 
ceded power to designated successors after 
largely free and fair elections in 2004, 
are important indications that substantial 
progress is being made towards the 
development of democracy in Africa.5 
Africa, which has long been synonymous 
with conflict,6 a lack of democracy, poor 
governance, human rights violations and 
underdevelopment, is beginning to take the 
first tentative steps towards transforming 
itself. Although this is a nascent and very 
fragile process, the outlook is nevertheless 
promising. This is because the process 
is underpinned by a new continental-
governance architecture, the product 
of the will and determination of the so-
called reformist group of countries to 
revive and renew the continent.' Between 
2000 and 2004, the combined efforts of 
these countries resulted in the adoption 
5 '·The Times, Tbt:y are A' ch.mging", 16 j:mu:1ry 201)5, 
AL.ul & Gwtrdi<m ([on!inc]). 
(1 In 2003 the African Union (AU) idcnrified ll ongoing 
conflicts in Africa. 
7 This group includes South Africa, Nigeria, E~rpr, 
Algeria, Senegal, Uganda, Botswana, ~-iozambique, 
Tanzania and Ghan.t. 
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and launch of four major initiatives to 
overhaul and restructure the governance 
of the continent. They are the Constitutive 
Act of the African Union (CAAU), the 
Protocol relating to the establishment 
of the Peace and SecuritY Council of the 
African Union, the New. Partnership for 
Africa's Development (Nepad), and the 
tv!emorandum of Understanding on Security, 
Stability, Development and Co-operation in 
Africa (CSSDCA). 
These initiatives are comprised of 
two legal instruments and two special 
programmes and they are all predicated on 
the notion that peace, security, democracy 
and political governance are essential 
preconditions for social and economic 
development. In terms of these initiatives, 
therefore, peace and security is placed at the 
heart of the new endeavour to transform 
the way that Africa is governed. Together 
these initiatives constitute the four pillars of 
Africa~s new continental peace and securitv 
architecture. Collectively, i·1 an overlappi;g 
bur complementary fashion, they provide 
the values, norms, principles, institutions~ 
mechanisms, procedures and performance 
indicators of the new continental security 
framework, which is the basis for a . 
collective securitv system in Africa. 
These new de~el~pments in Africa 
coincide with a reprioritisation by the West 
of African issues. Following the United 
States' withdrawal from Somalia in 1993 
and the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, the 
West began to de-prioritise African issues. 
However, since the terrorist attacks of 9 
September 200 I, Africa has been accorded 
an increasing strategic significance by 
the West. Accordingly, in what should be 
seen as an emerging security relationship 
between Africa and the \Vest, the West has 
been increasingly supporting the process of 
creating a new African peace and security 
structure. 
This stuc'y examines both the basic 
structural changes in the governance of 
peace and security on the African continent 
and also the approach of the West ro these 
positive developments. The study outlines 
the key political changes and processes 
that have motivated the development of 
these initiatives as well as the conceptual 
notions that underpin them. The studv 
then examines the role that each of th.ese 
initiatives will play in relation to peace 
and security on the continent and it 
assesses whether these initiatives have 
the institutional potential to constitute a 
viable basis for dealing with conflict on the 
continent. The processes and challenges of 
establishing the Peace and Security Council 
(PSC), the key operational structure of 
the new peace and security architecture, 
are examined with a view to determining 
the most urgent and important capabilitv 
requirements of the PSC and the most lil~ely 
avenues for addressing these. 
With regard to the West, the study 
examines the Western security orientation 
towards Africa and what has· been done to 
support the development of African peace 
and security initiatives. It analyses the 
basis of the emerging security relationship 
between Africa and the \Vest and assesses 
the state of the relationship and the 
prospects for the future of this relationship. 
A false dawn 
In 1960 the British Prime Minister Harold 
Macmillan delivered his famous "Winds 
of change" speech to the South African 
Parliament; he characterised the African 
colonies' independence struggles as a "wind 
of change" that was beginning to blow 
across the continent. 
The end of colonialism did not, however, 
bring about any bright dawn for Africa. 
African independence coincided with both 
the Cold \Var and the Apartheid eras. 
Independence turned into dependence as 
Africa was once again carved up into client 
states. The rival superpowers were prepared 
to support and prop up whatever leader or 
regime would do their bidding, regardless 
of how undemocratic, oppressive and 
cor~·upt they were. Most newly-independent 
Atncan states were characterised by an 
absence of democracy and human rights, 
massive failures of governance, endemic 
corruption, an absence of technical skills 
and a lack of finance. Furthermore, the 
borders of these newly independent states, 
created by agreements between colonial 
powers, are mostly inappropriate to 
their social environment. lY!eanwhile, 
Apartheid South Africa proceeded to 
desrabilise the subcontinent. During 
this time Africa went backwards and, 
indeed, the only thing that developed was 
underdevelopment. By the end of the Cold 
War and the end of Apartheid, Africa had 
already become synonymous with conflict, 
underdevelopment and human suffering.' 
After the end of the Cold War, with the 
exception of a handful of countries, the 
international community deprioritised 
African issues and to all intents and 
purposes abandoned the continent to its 
own fare. 
African solutions to African problems 
The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) 
was established in 1963 to promote co-
operation among the newly independent 
nations of Africa. Its main objectives 
included: ridding the continent of 
colonialism and apartheid, promoting 
unity and solidarity among African States, 
safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of member states and promoting 
international co-operation within the 
S Over the lasr four decaJcs there ha\'C been at least 30 
major violent conflicts which have killed approximate-
ly 7 million people and displaced many millions more 
(Shannon Field, ed., /'e;JCC in Africa. TouMrds a Cof-
labor..;tii'C Security Rcgi111c (Johannesburg: Institmc for 
Global Dialogue. 2004) p. 19). According tO the \\torld 
Bank, excluding the cost of refugee a~sisrance and 
environmemal degradation, conflict divcrrs approxi-
mately l billion US dollars a year frnm development in 
Central Africa and in excess of 800 million US dollars 
per annum in West Africa. African countries occupy 
the bottom 20 places on the UNDP UN development 
index ~md people born in these countries have only a 
60 per cenr chance of reaching the age of 40. \A1nhony 
V;m Nicuwkerk, "The Role of the AU and Ncpad 
in Afrir.:.1's new Security Regime" in Peace in Afric~T. 
Touurds a Cdlabor,lfil'c Security Regime, ed. Shannon 
Field. iJoh,mnesburg: lnsrinne for Global Di.1!oguc. 
2004), pp. 55-57). 
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framework of the United Nations.9 The 
OAU's greatest success was the creation 
of an African and international consensus 
in support of the struggle to liberate the 
continent from colonialism and apartheid. 
Its greatest failure pertains to the area of 
peace and security, where it suffered from a 
number of inherent weaknesses. 
The OAU was created to protect 
the independence of its members 
- not only against encroachment 
by former colonial powers, bur 
also against threats from other 
member states. Rather than 
collective security, the OAU charter 
prioritised sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and non-interference in 
the intemal affairs of member 
states, and purposely limited 
rhe powers of the organisation's 
Secretary General. As a result, the 
OAU's dispute resolution structures 
were largely undeveloped and 
unused. w 
Starting as a light breeze in the early 1990s 
and with a steadily gathering strength over 
the last decade and a half, the "winds of 
change" began once again to blow across 
the African continent. In the early 1990s 
African leaders began to realise that in 
order to avoid the further marginalisation 
of their continent and to improve its socio-
economic performance they would have to 
respond to the changes that were brought 
about by the end of the Cold War. They 
realised that the continent would have to 
be politically, socially and economically 
transformed and that armed conflict was 
the single most important factor preventing 
the achievement of these objectives." This 
growing determination to transform the 
continent and for this purpose make conflict 
9 "African Union in .1 Nutshell", Afric,m Uuion website 
l[online 10 jan 1006]), 
10 Van Nleuwknk, .. The Role of the AU and Ncpad ... ", 
pp. 4'1-42. 
[ 1 Astrid Espegren, "Thl· Organisation of Afric;u1 Unity 
and Conflict Management, Srill a Toothless Bulldog?" 
The NUPJ Report, no.247,july J999 (Oslo: Norwe-
giom lnstiturc of lmernational Affairs (NUPI)): 26. 
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resolution the number one priority, is 
reflected in the "Declaration on the Political 
and Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and 
the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in 
the World" adopted by the Organisation 
of African Unity (OAU) in Addis Ababa in 
1990. This Declaration states that, in order 
for the OAU to deal constructively with the 
problems of the continent, it would have to 
become involved in conflict management. 12 
The declaration initiated the process of 
developing new conflict management 
institutions and mechanisms for the OAU.u 
These ideas were developed further in 
the "Kampala Document", which was 
the final report of the conference that 
the OAU and the United Nations (UN) 
Economic Commission for Africa jointly 
sponsored in Kampala in 1991 u_nder the 
aegis of the African Le,lderslup .Forum. 
This report proposed the establishment 
of a permanent Conference on Security, 
Stability, Development and Co-operation 
and the establishment of a continental 
peacekeeping machinery. These proposals 
had a major influence on the decJsJon by the 
OAU to establish a l"vlechanism for Conflict, 
Prevention, l'v1anagement and Resolution 
(the Mechanism) in Cairo in June 1993.'.' 
The primary objective of the Mechamsm 
was conflict prevention. However, the 
Ivlechanism did also provide the framework 
for aurhorising and implementing election 
monitoring activities and a number of small-
scale peacekeeping operations, namely: 
• 
• 
• 
12 
13 
14 
An observer mission in Burundi in 
1993-94. 
An observer mission in the Comoros in 
1997. 
The deployment of military observers 
with the UN in the territorial dispute 
Th(~ Charter of rhe OA U provided for a Commis~ion 
of fvlcdiarion, Conciliation and Arbirr.uinn, bur it 
was ne\'er operation:l!iscd. (Fcrn.1nda F3ri;1, "Crisis 
.\lanagemcm in Sub-S;1hamn Africa: The l~olc nf ;he 
Europc;1n Union'', Oc~il:>i?llilf !'ilfJ_a, 1~0. ),!• Aprd 
2004 {Paris: Institute tnr SC'cunry Stud!CS, Europe;1n 
Union): 13). . 
The OAU depended on ad hoe committees ro mcd1are 
in conflicts bcrwcen African States (Espcgren, ''The 
Organis;1tion of African Unity ... ": 26}. 
f f . u . .. ,_ Espegi"cn, "The OrganiS;ltion o A ncan nny ... : -i. 
between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1998.1' 
Although the Mechanism improved the 
OAU's instirurional capacity to handle 
conflicts, it was a '"'weak instrument" 
and a "small step towards security co· 
operation" .1n 
The reasons why the Mechanism was 
a weak instrument and a qualified step 
forward were the same reasons why 
the OAU, before the adoption of the 
J'vlechanism, had become notorious for its 
non-intervention. 17 Article 3 of the OAU 
Charrer stressed the sovereign equality and 
territorial integrity of all member states 
and non-interference in the internal affairs 
of other states. lt thus made no provision 
for intervention in the internal affairs of 
a member state. The Mechanism did not 
legitimate intervention, and the OAU could 
only engage in domestic contlicts with the 
consent of the parties concerned. Because 
the OAU was bound by the principle, albeit 
informal, of consensus in decision-making, 
it became predisposed to inaction and 
paralysis. There was a lack of political will 
amongst member states to prioritise peace 
and securitv issues, and there was also a 
shortage of financial resources with which 
to develop peacekeeping capabilities and ro 
implement peacekeeping operations. The . 
reasons for the OAU's failure in the area of 
peace and security constitute an important 
checklist for assessing the viability of the 
new peace and security architecture, in 
particular the CAAU and the PSC. 
The adoption of the Mechanism was not 
the end of the road for the process initiated 
by rhe Kampala document. Beginning in 
1993, a number of significant positive and 
negative developments combined to add 
a powerful impetus to the movement to 
comprehensively restructure, reform and re-
invent the peace and security architecture of 
15 V.tn Ni<.:uwkcrk, ''The RcJle of the AU .md Nepad ... ., , 
pp. -13--44. 
16 Espegn:n, "The Organisation of African Unity ... ": 67, 
65, 63. 
17 According to Van Nicuwkerk, prior to the adoption 
of the ;..-Iechanism the OAU had only been involved in 
rwo of Africa':; contlicts (Van Nicuwkerk, ''The Role of 
rhe All and Nepad ... '', p. 42). 
the continent. These were: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
South Africa's peaceful transition from 
Apartheid to constitutional democracy 
South African President Thabo Mbeki's 
African Renaissance Project 
The reluctance of the international 
community to become engaged in 
African conflicts after the United States 
withdrew from Somalia in 1993, which 
was further underlined by the failure of 
the international commu~ity to prevent 
and/or halt the genocide in Rwanda in 
1994 
The war in the DRC from 1996 and 
the continuation of existing and 
proliferation of new mainly intra-state 
conflicts across the continent 
The end of military dictatorship in 
Nigeria and the return to civilian rule 
under President Obasanjo 
The deepening political and socio-
economic marginalisation of the 
continent 
The increasing human suffering caused 
by conflict, poor governance and 
disease, in particular HJV-Aids and 
malaria. 
The South African dimension 
On 8 May 1996, in his address on behalf 
of the African National Congress (ANC) 
on the occasion of the adoption by the 
Constitutional Assembly of South Africa's 
new and final Constitution -in the same 
Parliament in Cape Town where, 46 years 
earlier, Harold Macmillan had delivered his 
speech -the then Deptm· President of South 
Africa Thabo Mbeki declared: 
On an occasion as this, we should, 
perhaps, start from the beginning. 
So let me begin. I am an African. 
In this speech, Mbeki conflated the emerging 
new post-Apartheid South African identity 
with that of African-ness. Throughout · 
the speech he returned, as a refrain, to the 
words, "I am an African.,, 
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... ! am an African. 
I am born of the peoples of the 
continent of Africa. 
The pain of the violent conflicts 
that the peoples of Liberia, 
Somalia, the Sudan, Burundi and 
Algeria bear is also a pain I bear· 
The dismal shame of poverty, ' 
suffering and human degradation 
of my continent is a blight that we 
share. 
The blight on our happiness that 
derives from this and from our drift 
to the periphery of the ordering 
of human affairs leaves us in a 
persistent shadow of despair. 
This savage road to which nobody 
should be condemned. · 
This thing that we have done todav 
in this small corner of a great ·' 
continent that has contributed 
so decisively to the evolution of 
humanity says that Africa reaffirms 
that she is continuing her rise from 
the ashes. 
Whatever the setbacks of the 
moment, nothing can stop us now! 
Whatever the difficulties, Africa 
shall be at peace! 
However improbable it may sound 
to the sceptics, Africa will prosper! 
Whoever we may be, whatever 
our immediate interest, however 
much we carry baggage from our 
past, however much we have been 
caught by the fashion of cynicism 
and loss of faith in the capacity of 
the people, let us here today say 
-nothing can stop us now! 
With this speech l'vlbeki laid the cornerstone 
of his and South Africa's commitment to 
the concept of an 'African Renaissance', 
wh1ch he went on to launch in April 1997. 
Chns Alden and Garrh Le Pere, in their 
paper on South Africa's foreign policy, state 
that "Mbeki's speech set the stage for a 
10 IFS Info 1/2006 
new mythic charter, conceptual narrative 
and normative agenda for what was 
needed to impel the continent's revival"." 
lvllwki is not the author of the notion of an 
'African Renaissance', as the concept has 
been around in African political discourse 
since the colonial period. It was first used 
by the Senegalese intellectual Cheik anra 
Diop in the struggle against colonial rule, 
with the intention of capturing the dreams 
and aspirations of the people of Africa 
in their quest for self-determination. 1' At 
an OAU meeting in June 1994 Nelson 
Mandela called upon Africa to bring about 
an 'African Renaissance'- ''We must say 
that there is no obstacle big enough to 
stop us from bringing about an African 
Renaissance. n 20 
Mbeki's concept of an 'African 
Renaissance' is underpinned by a core idea 
which was originally articulated by the 
celebrated Kenyan professor Ali Mazrui, 
namelv that Africa should cease looking 
outsid~ for help and should instead uplift 
itself,'! This idea of an African Renaissance 
has become an important pillar of Mbeki 's 
foreign policy and a key orientation of his 
administration." Mbeki sees the objective of 
continental renewal and South Africa's own 
internal transformation and reconstruction 
as mutually reinforcing objectives: 
IS 
19 
20 
' ' ,;;.,) 
It is very directly in the interest of 
South Africa that there should be 
direct development in the rest of 
the continent ... I don't think you 
can have sustainable successful 
development in this country if the 
rest of the continent is in flames. 23 
Chris Alden .md G.mh Le Pere, "South Africa's Posr-
ApMtheid Foreign Policy: From Rcconciliarion to Re-
vlv.tl, ,. Addphi P.1per, no. 361, lnn.·rn.uional lnsrinnc 
for Strategic studies {115)) (2003): 60. 
Fan tu Cheru. A(ric~m Rt:Jiilissallce. l~o.rdm,J/JS to the 
Ch,Jllengcs of G!obalisatio11 (London: Zed Books, 
2002), p. XIL 
Ku)eni Dlamini, •· Uhuru betrayed", Su11da)' Times, 17 
July 2005; 21. 
Allister Sparks. Beyond the Miracle, Inside the New 
South Africa (Johannesburg and Cape TO\vn: Jon.Hhan 
Ball Publishers, 2003], p. 324. 
Alden and Le Pcre, "Sourh Africa's Post-Apartht•id 
Foreign Policy .... "': 61. 
Sparks, B~·yoiUf the Mintclc ... , p. 324. 
South Africa under Apartheid was a major 
cause of the conflict and underdevelopment 
in most of the subcontinent. Having 
transformed itself, South Africa began 
harnessing the inspiration and dynamism of 
its own internal transformation project for 
the renewal of the continent as a whole." 
This was noted by observers and other 
governments. For instance, Norway's then 
outgoing Ambassador to South Africa, John 
Bech, made the following comment about 
South Africa's role in Africa: 
I'm still an optimist regarding 
Africa's future. I will remain so as 
long South Africa continues to take 
a leading role, both economically, 
politically and diplomatically.25 
Africa seen from a Western security 
perspective 
In October 2004 the British International 
Development Minister Hilary Berm, 
when describing the work of the British 
government's Africa Cotnrnission said, 
"there is a moral imperative to do this. " 26 
There is indeed a moral imperative for the 
international community and in particular 
the West to re-engage meaningfully with 
Africa. But, in addition to the profound 
moral issues, there are also compelling 
strategic reasons why Africa is getting 
back on the Western security agenda. Benn 
described them as follows: 
If you don't tackle poverty, injustice 
24 South Africa Is very conscious of the need to not 
behave as nr be perceived as a hegemon, impcriali~r or 
bully, but rather a country that acts collecrh·cly and 
multilaterally. South Africa has the biggest economy in 
Africa. If one rakes the rest of South Africa our of rhe 
Lquarion, Gauteng, South Africa's smallest bur richesr 
province, would be the second-biggest economy in 
Africa after Egypt. 
15 Interview in Prctori,l New5: ''Norw<lr and South Africa 
stay Best of Friends," 11 January 2005, (Independent 
Onlinc South Africa [onlinc JO Jan 2006}). 
26 The UK's Africa Commission aims m "seize 2005 as 
an opportunity to make a difference for Africa,,., using 
the coincidence of the UK chairpcrsonship of both the 
Group of 8 (G8l and the European Union. Andrew 
C<twrhorne ;tnd Andrcw Hammond, Business D.1y, 4 
October 20()4, p. 6. 
and inequality around the world, 
then we are never going to have a 
safe and secure world in which to 
live .. ." 
According to foreign and security policy 
analysts Herbst and lvlills, development in 
Africa is "almost universally recognised" as 
one of the major problems confronting the 
world in the 21" century." The events of 11 
September 20()1 highlighted the importance 
of development and security in Africa: 
There is a global consensus that 
Africa's failure to develop threatens 
not only the future of hundreds of 
millions of people on rhe continent 
itself, but also that it is an 
international problem. The region's 
continued impoverishment may 
provide a reservoir for HIV/Aids 
and a sanctuary for terrorists ... 29 
Africa, with its numerous failed stares and 
ongoing conflicts, meets all of the criteria 
that have been used by Western security 
communities to develop frameworks for 
analysing important new security threats. 
The EU, NATO and the United States 
understand that failed states, poverry and 
conflict, as found in Africa, can contribute 
to the rise of terrorism or the creation of 
safe havens for foreign terrorists. In the 
context of Africa this is by no means an 
academic notion. It is well known that 
Sudan was Osama Bin Laden's redoubt 
from 1991 to 1996 and that two of AI 
Qaeda 's first high-profile attacks rook place 
on African soil, namely the attacks on the 
United States' embassies in Nairobi and 
Dar-Es-Salaam. The former US Deputy 
Secretary of Stare for African Affairs, Susan 
Rice, in her testimony to the US Congress 
in November 2001, described Africa as 
"the world's soft underbelly for global 
27 Ibid. 
28 Gcffrcy Herbst and Greg X-I ills. ''The Future of Afri..:a: 
A Ne\\' Order in Sight," Addp!Ji fl<lJNr, no. 361, 
The lmernational Insrltme for Strategic Srudics (l!SS) 
(2003): 5. 
2SI Ibid.: 5. 
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terrorism. 'l 30 
The US National Security Strategy released 
on 19 September 2002 recognises the danger 
posed by poverty and weak states: 
... Poverty does not make poor 
people into terrorists and 
murderers. Yet, poverty, weak 
institutions and corruption can 
make weak states vulnerable to 
terrorist networks and drug cartels 
within their borders ... 11 
This strategy also proposed that rhe above-
mentioned situation could be remedied by 
supporting 'key allies', including in Africa, 
Kenya, Ethiopia, Nigeria and South Africa. 
In December 2004, Major General Samuel 
Helland, the head of the combined Joint 
Task Force- Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) 
said that terrorist groups including AI 
Qaeda were exploiting the lawless areas in 
the ungoverned spaces of the Horn of Africa 
to hide, recruit and train members and 
possibly to plan operations in other parts of 
the world." CJTF-HOA was established in 
2002 to deter, pre-empt and disable terrorist 
threats emanating principally from Somalia, 
Kenya and Yemen. 
The then US permanent representative 
to the UN, Ambassador .John C. Danforth, 
stared at a meeting of the UN Security 
Council in Nairobi on 4 November 2004: 
The United States believes that 
the African Union is a critical 
-perhaps the critical -component 
to peace and security in Africa. The 
recent deployment of the African 
Union mission to Sudan and the 
AU sponsored peace talks among 
the Darfur parties in Nigeria attest 
to the significant, multi-faceted 
nature of the contribution that 
the AU makes to stability in the 
30 Ibid.: 26. 
31 Ibid.: 6. 
32 "US Commander Claims Al-Qacda bases in Somalia"', 
C1pe Argus, 28 December 1004 (Independent Onlinc 
Sou rh Africa [online 10 Jan 2006]). 
12 IFS Info 1/2006 
region.33 
The NATO approach is more circumscribed. 
While it accepts that geography will no 
longer act "as our shield", it simultaneously 
confines its regional analysis of areas 
from which stability will "spill over" 
to northern Africa." 3" Nevertheless, in 
2005 NATO began assisting the AU 
mission in Darfur, Sudan with strategic 
airlift and training. -'5 At the G8 Summit 
in Kananaskis in 2002, the GS adopted 
an Africa Action Plan (AAP) which 
was a response to the New Partnership 
for Africa's Development (NEPAD). In 
addition ro commitments to promote the 
strengthening of institutions and governance 
and to foster trade, economic growth and 
sustainable development, the AAP contains 
commitments to promote peace and security. 
Since Kananaskis the GS has made progress 
with regard to the peace and security 
commitments in the AAP- at Sea Island 
in 2004 the GS committed itself to train 
and, where necessary, equip some 75,000 
AU troops by 2010, and at the Gleneagles 
Summit in 200.5 the G8 undertook to train 
up to 25,000 extra peace keepers and ro 
provide assistance to the African Standhy 
Force (ASF). 
The European Security Strategy of the 
EU adopted on '15 December 2003 identifies 
regional conflicts and state failure, both 
of which are prevalent in Africa, as key 
threats to Europe. This strategy identifies 
the African Union as a regional organisation 
that can make an important contribution 
to a "more orderly world," and goes on to 
describe Europe's relationships with "our 
partners in Africa" as an important asset on 
which to build. In what has been described 
as a "ground breaking" developn1ent, the 
EU decided on 11 December 2003 to spend 
33 ''African Union Criric.1l ro Peace Llnd Security, Dan-
fonh )J.YS", USUN Press Relc.tse, no.155, 5 Novem-
ber 1004 (USINFO {online 10 J;m 2006ji. 
34 ''Securing the Pence: The NATO Vision," the Secretary 
Gcncml, Lord Roberrson's speech .u the NATO Public 
Diplomacy Conference. Bruo;sc\s, 16 October 2003. 
35 "NATO's nssist.mcc to the African Union for Darfur 
-How did it evolve", Topics (NATO [online 10 .Jan 
2006]1, 
250 million euros from the European 
Development Fund (EDF) to support 
African peacekeeping operations through 
the African Peace Facility."' Furthermore, 
Operation Artemis in Bunia in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was 
also ground breaking because it was the first 
autonomous military operation initiated by 
the EU; it was also the first EU operation 
outside Europe and the first EU operation 
conducted under Chapter 7 of the UN 
Charter.-'7 
Africa, in the words of Jonathan 
Stevenson has, ''renewed strategic 
resonance. " 3s A new security relationship 
between Africa and the West is emerging. 
There is nothing inherently incompatible 
between African security objectives and 
Western security objectives. Accordingly, 
with Africa requesting Western assistance 
for its security challenges and the West 
seeking to address the security challenges 
that have emerged in the post 9/11 context, 
this emerging relationship has the potential 
to be a win-win situation. 
One of the keys to the success or failure 
of this relationship will be the degree to 
which development and conflict resolution 
processes are treated as opposite sides of 
the same coin. The United States National 
Security Strategy, the European Security 
Strategy of the EU and the AAP of the GS all 
recognise the importance of development for 
effective conflict resolution, and indeed, at 
the 2005 Gleneagles Summit the G8 decided 
to commit greater attention and resources 
to reconstruction and reconciliation in 
post-conflict countries by providing, where 
necessary, rapid and flexible multilateral 
and bilateral debt relief for post-conflict 
countries and allocating grant financing for 
reconstruction, disarmament, demobilisation 
and the reintegration into civilian society of 
36 Stiile Ulrik:;en, Catrionn Gourlay and Catriona 1-lacc. 
"Oper:uion :\rtcmis: The Shape of Things ro Come?" 
lntenwtional Peacckeepi11g, \"OI. 11. no. 3 (autumn 
2004): 521. 
37 Ibid.: 508. 
38 Jonarhan Stevcnson, '"'Africa's Growing Strategic Reso-
nance," Sun•h•,"J[, JISS Quarterly, vol. 45, no. 4 (\'\1imcr 
2003-2004), 154. 
former combatants. 39 
Although there is broad agreemeot 
between the United States and the European 
Union about what is required in Africa, 
namely peace, security, democracy, good 
governance and developmeot, there is in 
practice a distinct difference in the approach 
that each takes on the issue. So, despite the 
EU and the United States agreeing on the 
threats posed by failing states and terrorism 
in Africa, there is a risk that the lack of 
uniformity in approach and emphasis will 
confuse and indeed endanger the success 
of conflicr resolution endeavours in Africa. 
There is also a risk that Africa may once 
again become some contemporary form of 
surrogate battleground for the war on terror. 
Further, there is the potential for Africa to 
become a terrain on which the emerging 
diplomatic rivalry between the United States 
and the EU is played out. In this regard the 
utility of operation Artemis, as a European 
team-building exercise after the fall-out 
over the war in Iraq, raises a number of 
imporraot questions. In addition, the United 
States has made clear the importance it 
attaches to Africa's oil resources. Nobody 
can afford another 'scramble for Africa.' 
The African Union replaces the OAU 
The decision to establish the AU was taken 
at the Sirte Extraordinary Session of the 
OAU in 1999. The Lome Summit of the 
OAU in 2000 adopted the Constitutive Act 
of the Union and the Lusaka Summit of the 
OAU in 2001 agreed on the road map for 
the implementation of the AU. The Durban 
Summit of the OAU in 2002launched the 
AU and convened the 1" Assembly of rhe 
Heads of States of the AU. 
The aim is a functional pan-
Africanism which would produce 
the political stability that can 
underpin economic growth. If 
liberating Africa was the guiding 
39 Africa, Glene~lp;lcs 2005 Summit Do..:umcnts (2005), 
paragraph 11 (a) and (b), CS Glellr:agles 2005 (G8 
Presidency [on line 10 J;tn 2006]). 
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ideology of the OAU, the AU's 
vision is building institutions 
- a legislature, judiciary and a 
commission - that can reinforce 
national development strategies 
and reduce Africa's dependence on 
Western economies."' 
The AU has 53 member states. South Africa 
Nigeria, Senegal, Algeria and Egypt are 
regarded as some of the most influential 
member states. A key component of the 
vision of the AU is that it should focus 
on the promotion of peace, security and 
stability on the continent as a prerequisite 
for the implementation of the development 
and integration agenda of the Union. 
Accordingly, one of the AU's objectives 
is the promotion of peace, security and 
stability on the continenr. 41 
The Constitutive Act of the African 
Union 
The Constitutive Act of the African Union 
(CAAU) was adopted by the Assembly 
of rhe Heads of States and Governments 
(AAHSG) of the OAU in Lome on 11 July 
2000. The CAAU fonnallv entered into 
force on 26 lvlay 2001. Ti1e CAAU is the 
overarching and enabling instrument of the 
AU. 
The CAAU lays the foundations for an 
effective collective security system in Africa 
by linking peace and security with the 
protection of human rights. Article 3(b), 
which deals with the defence of sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and the independence of 
member states, is counterbalanced by Article 
3(f), 3(g) and 3(h) which deal with the 
promotion of peace, security and stability, 
the promotion of democratic principles, 
popular participation and good governance, 
and the promotion and protection of human 
rights. 
Article 4 of the CAAU contains the 
..J-0 Parrick Smith, "Africa's New Order, African Union: 
Testing rhe limits of a Crowded Agend,1 ", A(rim Re-
port, no. 1 (.:\by 2005): 40. 
41 "The Vision of rhe AU" and "the Ohjecti\"es of rhc 
AU", A{ricmr Union udtsitc ([online 10 j.tn 1006 j}. 
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principles that will govern the functioning of 
the Union. Article 4(g) and Article 4(h) and 
the relationship between these two articles 
represents, in peace and security terms, a 
major departure from the OAU. 
Article 4(g) which upholds the principle 
of non-interference, and Article 4(h) which 
gives the Union the right to intervene in a 
member state, are apparently contradictory. 
However, the AU non-interference principle 
in Article 4(g) only restricts any member 
state from interference in the internal 
affairs of another. Unlike Article 2(7) of 
the UN Charter, which states that "nothing 
contained in the present Charter shall 
authorise the UN to intervene in matrers 
which are essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any state", and Article 3 of 
the OAU Charter, Article 4(g) does not in 
and of itself restrain the AU as an institution 
from interfering in the internal affairs of 
member states.41 
Article 4(h), on the other hand, gives 
the AU a right to intervene in members' 
conflicts. Under Article 4(h) the AU has a 
right to intervene in member states. This 
right to intervene must be exercised entirely 
at the discretion of the Assembly and 
consequently the consent of the concerned 
state is immaterial. Further, this being a 
right, no individual state, including those in 
whose territories the conflict is taking place, 
may prevent the AU from coming into its 
territory. Unless the Assembly decides not to 
intervene, a state can only avoid n1andatory 
intervention by renouncing its membership 
of the A U and withdrawing from the 
organisation as provided for in Article 31.43 
By ratifying the AU Act, member states 
have agreed that the AU can intervene in 
their affairs. Accordingly, in empowering the 
AUto that effect under Article 4(h), member 
states must be deemed ro have conceded 
a quantum of their legal and political 
sovereignty to the Union; and once a state 
42 Adcmob Abass and ~vlashood A. Badcrin, "Towards 
Effecti~·e Collective Security and Human Rights Pron>.c-
tion in Africa: An Ass(·:;smcm of the Constitutive Act 
of rhe New Afric.m Union," 11u' Nctbcrl.mds lutema-
tiunal Llll' Reuii!ll', vol. XLIX (2002): 15. 
43 Ibid.: 15-16. 
has given its consent it cannot go back, 
except as permitted by the Act itself.'' 
Article 31 deals with cessation of 
membership. Article 31.1 provides that any 
state wishing to renounce its membership 
shall provide written notification, and that 
at the end of one year from rhe date of such 
notification, the Act will cease to apply to 
the renouncing state, which will accordingly 
cease to belong to the Union. However, 
Article 31.2 provides that during the one 
year referred to above, the member state 
wishing to withdraw must comply with 
the provisions of the Act and is bound to 
discharge its obligations under the Act up to 
the date of its withdrawal. 
Article 6 states that the Assembly shall be 
the supreme organ of the Union and Article 
9.1(a) gives the Assembly the sole power to 
make policies. This raises questions about 
oversight and accountability because all of 
the other organs of the Union, including 
the Court of .Justice and the Pan-African 
Parliament, will be subordinate to the 
Assembly." 
Under Article 7 the decisions of the 
Assembly will be by consensus, failing which 
by a two-thirds majority of the member 
states. Procedural matters, including the 
question of whether a matter is one of 
procedure or not, will be decided by simple 
majority. This is a very important provision 
because it prevents the re-occurrence 
of the OAU situation whereby the need 
for consensus could cause paralysis and 
inaction. Article 9.2 empowers the Assembly 
to delegate any of its powers and functions 
to any organ of the Union (this includes the 
Peace and Security Council). 
Article 30 provides for the suspension 
from the activities of the Union of 
governments that come to power through 
unconstitutional means. The importance of 
this Article in the African context speaks 
for itself. The co-operation between South 
Africa, Zimbabwe and Equatorial Guinea 
44 lbid.: 19. 
45 .Musifiky !'vlwanas:ali, "Emerging Securiry Architecture 
in Afri..:a", Policy: Issues and Actor . .;, ,,ol. 17, no. 4, 
(L'nrrc f()r Policy Srudics, Joh:umesburg {February 
2004), 23. 
in foiling the mercenary-led coup attempt 
in Equatorial Guinea in 2004, and the use 
by South Africa of its new anti-mercenary 
legislation, provide an indication of the 
changed political sentiment and will which 
should have a positive impact on the 
implementation of this Article. 
The CAAU rakes a fundamentally 
different approach to the maintenance of 
peace and security from that taken by the 
OAU. Article 4(h), which gives the Union 
rhe right to intervene, has substantially 
weakened the principle of non-interference, 
to the extent rh at it may no longer be 
an effective shield behind which the 
perpetrators of conflict and human rights 
violations can hide. The AU is empowered 
in a way that the OAU never was, even after 
the adoption of the Mechanism. The AU is 
not the continuation of rhe OAU by another 
name- for example, in July 2004, the AU 
agreed to send peace keepers to Darfur and 
in 2005 the AU intervened to block Faure 
Gnassingbe from taking over the presidency 
in Togo on the death of his father, without 
facing an election. The AU and ECOWAS, 
the regional West African organisation, 
forced him to back down and hold elections. 
The key issues with regard to the 
CAAU will be irs operarionalisarion and 
implementation. This will be a function 
of political will, commitment and the 
availability of the necessary material 
resources. In this regard, the AU's 
interventions such as in Darfur and Togo 
and the enhanced commitment of the 
international donor community to finance 
African initiatives, in particular the G8 at 
the 2005 Gleneagles Summit, are positive 
indications for rhe future. 
The protocol relating to the 
establishment of the Peace and Security 
Council of the African Union 
The Protocol relating to the Establishment 
of the Peace and Security Council of the 
African Union was adopted at the inaugural 
summit of the AU in Durban in July 2002, 
and entered into force on 26 December 
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2003. The Protocol replaces the Cairo 
Declaration and supersedes the resolutions 
and decisions of the OAU relating to 
the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 
w1anagemenr and Resolution in Africa, 
which are in conflict with the present 
Protocol. 
Article 2.1 of the Protocol establishes 
the Peace and Security Council (PSC) as 
a standing decision-making body for the 
'"prevention, management and resolution 
of conflict." !t stares further that "the Peace 
and Security Council shall be a collective 
security and early \Varning arrangement to 
facilitate timely and efficient response to 
conflict and crises in Africa." The PSC is 
the key operational structure of the peace 
and security architecture and as such it 
will play a pivotal role. lt contributes the 
institutions, the structures, the mechanisms 
and procedures of the architecture. 
Article 2.2 states that the PSC is to be 
supported by the Commission, a Panel of 
the Wise, a Continental Early Warning 
System, an African Standby Force and a 
Special Fund. 
The objectives for which the PSC is 
established are contained in Article 3. 
These include: the promotion of peace, 
security and stabiliry; the anticipation and 
prevention of conflicts and, where conflicts 
have occurred, the undertaking of peace-
making and peace-building functions; the 
promotion and implementation of peace-
building and post-conflict reconstruction; 
the co-ordination of continental efforts 
in the prevention and combating of 
international terrorism; the development 
of a common defence policy for the Union; 
and the promotion and encouragement of 
democratic practices, good governance, the 
rule of law and the protection of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. 
Article 4 contains the principles that 
will guide the PS C. The Article states that 
"the PSC shall be guided by the principles 
enshrined in the CAAU, the Charter of 
the United Nations and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights." It goes on 
to say that the PSC shall, in particular, be 
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guided by 11 Principles, dealing inter alia 
with the following; the peaceful settlement 
of disputes and conflicts; early responses 
to contain crisis situations; respect for the 
rule of law and fundamental rights and 
freedoms and respect for the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of member states. 
Article 4(f), which states that the PSC 
shall be guided by the principles of "non-
interference by any member state in the 
internal affairs of another", is exactly the 
same as Article 4(g) of the CAAU. Article 
4(j) of the PSC refers to Article 4(h) of the 
CAAU and is identical to that Article. The 
issue of non-interference versus the right to 
intervene, as discussed above with regard to 
the CAAU, will also apply to the PSC. 
Article 5.1 deals with the membership of 
the Council. Ten members are elected for a 
term of two years and five members for a 
term of three years. Article 5.2 sets eligibility 
criteria for membership of the PSC. These 
include: the commitment to uphold the 
principles of the Union; contribution m 
the promotion and maintenance of peace 
and security and participation in conflict 
resolution, peace-making and peace-
building on the continent; capacity and 
commitment to shoulder the responsibilities 
of membership; contribution to the Peace 
Fund and commitment to honour financial 
obligations to the Union; and respect for 
constitutional governance, the rule of law 
and human rights. 
Article 5.4 provides for periodic review 
by the Assembly of the extent to which 
members of the PSC continue to meet the 
requirements of Article 5 .2. The rigorous 
criteria outlined in Article 5.2 should, if 
applied faithfully, reduce the possibility of 
the PSC being undermined by states with 
inappropriate bona fides and/or insufficient 
will and capacity. lt should also discourage 
so-called 'spoilers'. 
Article 6 outlines the functions that the 
PSC is mandated to perform. In terms of this 
Article the PSC is mandated to perform a 
wide variety of peace and security functions, 
ranging from mediation and early warning 
to peace support operations and post-
conflict reconstruction. Further, Article 
6(f) assigns the function of humanitarian 
action and disaster management to the PSC. 
Under Article 4(g), the PSC may be tasked 
with "any other functions decided by the 
Assembly." 
In terms of Article 7.1, the PSC shall 
exercise its functions in conjunction with 
the Chairperson of the Commission. Article 
7.1 contains a comprehensive list of 18 
peace and security tasks that the PSC is 
empowered to undertake. The PSC can, 
inter alia, undertake peace-making and 
peace-building functions to resolve conflicts; 
authorise the mounting and deployment 
of peace support operations; approve the 
modalities for intervention by the Union 
in a member state and institute sanctions 
whenever an unconstitutional change of 
government takes place in a member state. 
The above-mentioned powers would 
seem to indicate that a fairly substantial 
degree of autonomy and discretion have 
been vested in the PSC. Howeve1; Article 
7.1 (e) states that the PSC has the power to 
"recommend to the Assembly," pursuant 
to Article 4(h) of the CAAU, inrervention, 
on behalf of the Union in a member state in 
respect of war crimes, genocide and crimes 
against humanity. The words "recommend 
to the Assembly" are not found in any of the 
other sub-sections of Article 7.1. This would 
seem to imply that the other 17 powers all 
fall short of actual intervention in a member 
state of the Union, unless it is facilitated by 
an earlier mandate of the Assembly. This is 
consistent with Article 4(j), which deals with 
the principles that are to guide the operation 
of the PSC, and also Article 4(h) of the 
CAAU. Both of these articles clearly state 
that only the Assembly has the discretion to 
exercise the right of the Union to intervene 
in a member state. The impression that the 
PSC has the discretion to intervene in a 
member state without the approval of the 
Assembly or the consent of the affected state 
is clearly a misleading one, which appears to 
have been occasioned by poor drafting. 
Article 7.2, 3 and 4 establish the 
authority of the PSC vis-,1-l'is member 
stares." Article 8 deals, inter alia, with 
voting and in this regard Article 8.13 states 
rh at "while decisions of the PSC shall 
generally be guided by the principle of 
consensus, in cases where consensus cannot 
be reached, the PSC shall adopt its decisions 
on procedural matters by simple majority 
and decisions on all other matters by a two-
thirds majority". This is in line with the 
approach to decision-making followed in the 
CAAU. 
Article 9 deals with the "entry points" 
and "modalities" for action. Article 9.1 
empowers the PSC to take such initiatives 
and action it deems appropriate with 
regard to situations of potential conflict 
as well as actual conflicts and to that end, 
Article 9.2 states that the PSC "shall use its 
discretion to effect entry, whether through 
the collective intervention of the Council 
itself, or through its Chairperson and or the 
Chairperson of the Commission, the Panel 
of the Wise, and or in collaboration with 
the regional mechanisms". Again, these 
powers are not as wide as they appear to 
be because, as in the case of the powers 
outlined in Article 7.1 above, they would 
only be operable once the Assembly has 
decided to intervene in a member state. 
Article 11 deals with the Panel of the 
Wise, whose function it is to support the 
efforts of the PSC and the Chairperson of 
the Commission, particularly with respect 
to conflict prevention. The Panel of the Wise 
will be composed of "five highly respected 
African personalities from various segments 
of societv who have made an outstanding 
contribution to the cause of peace, security 
and development on the continent." The 
role of the Panel is to advise the PSC and 
the Chairperson of the Commission on all 
issues "pertaining to the promotion, and 
maintenance of peace, security and stability 
in Africa." 
Defence analyst Laurie Nathan argues, 
correctly, that the AU has not paid any 
46 ;\hvnnasali, ''Emerging Security Archirccrure in Af-
ri-:,1": 15. 
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serious institutional attention to mediation 
as a peacemaking strategy. He proposes 
that the PSC establish an "expert mediation 
unit" and that the Panel of the Wise, "be 
constituted as this unit". He says that if 
the Panel of the \'V'ise is not constituted as 
the AU's mediation unit, the AU should 
nevertheless establish, de nouo, an expert 
mediation unit and subordinate it to the 
Chair of the Commission." In practice, 
the AU has been calling upon South Africa 
and in particular President Mbeki to act 
as mediator in the conflicts in the DRC, 
Burundi, Cote D'Ivoire and Sudan. 
Article 12 deals with the establishment 
of the Continental Early Warning System 
and Article 13 the establishment of an 
African Standby Force (ASF). Article 
13.1 states that an African Standby Force 
shall be established ro enable the PSC to 
perform its responsibilities with respect to 
the deployment of peace support missions 
and intervention. According to the Article, 
"Such Force shall be composed of standby 
multi-disciplinary contingents, with 
civilian and military components in their 
countries' of origin and ready for rapid 
deployment at appropriate notice". Article 
13.2 requires member states to take steps 
to establish contingents for participation in 
peace support missions. Article 13.8 makes 
provision for the establishment of a military 
staff committee to advise and assist the PSC 
on "all questions relating to military and 
security requirements for the promotion 
and maintenance of peace and security in 
Africa,. 
Article 14 deals with peace-building and 
outlines the role and functions of the PSC 
in this regard. Article 15 gives the PSC an 
active role in co-ordinating and conducting 
humanitarian actions. The Article requires 
that the PSC develop its own capacity to 
undertake humanitarian actions and that the 
ASF should be "adequately equipped" to 
undertake humanitarian activities. 
Article 16 deals with the relationship 
·P Lauric N.uhan, ":\ledinrion and the AU's Pand of the 
\\'ise,. in Pe.Icc in Aji·ic.1. Towards •1 Colbbowtil'c 
,)'ewrity Regime, ed. Shannon hc!ds (Johannesburg: 
Institute for Global Di.1loguc, 1004), p. 63, 77. 
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between the PSC and the regional security 
mechanisms. Article 16.1 states that the 
Regional Mechanisms are "part of the 
overall security architecture of the Union, 
which has the primary responsibility for 
promoting peace, security and stability in 
Africa." Article 16 requires the PSC and 
the Chairperson of the Commission to 
"harmonise and co-ordinate" the activities 
of Regional Mechanisms to ensure that 
these activities are "consistent with the 
objectives and the principles of the Union" 
and to "work closely with Regional 
Mechanisms, to ensure effective partnership 
between them and the Peace and Security 
Council." The Article also makes provision 
for the conclusion of a "l'vlemorandum 
of Understanding on Co-operation 
between the Commission and the Regional 
Mechanisms". 
What the Protocol refers to as "Regional 
Mechanisms" are actually the continent's 
sub-regional bodies. Although these bodies 
fall outside the scope of this study, it is 
nevertheless important to point out that the 
regions are seen as "crucial building-blocs"'48 
not only in the area of peace, security and 
stability on the continent but also with 
regard to the socio-economic development 
of the continent. Article 16, which provides 
for a formal relationship between the PSC 
and the regional bodies, reflects a realisation 
on the part of the AU that it will have to 
relv on the conflict management activities 
of ~he continent's sub-regional bodies.49 In 
this regard the key question will be to what 
extent the regional organisations are able 
to carry the burden of peacekeeping and 
peacemaking. 5° 
The PSC: has proposed five regions, i.e. 
North, South, East, West and Central. This 
is logical, given that the AU recognises five 
48 .\laxie Schncman, "The African Union After rhc 
Durb:tn 2001 Summit,,., Occ.u.ionall'.1fJ£'r, Centre of 
AfricJ.n Studies, Unin:rsity of Copenhagen (February 
2003), 6. 
41.1 The Abuja Treaty of 1991 that established rhe African 
Economic Community (AEC) fnrmaliscd .md regulated 
the relationships between rhe OAU and irs five regiuna! 
economic organisations. 
50 Van Nieuwkerk, "The Role of the AU ,md Ncpad ... ", 
p. 55. 
regional economic organisations. Although 
the exact boundaries of the five regions have 
not yet been established, it already appears 
that the boundaries of the regions proposed 
bv the PSC will not correlate directly with 
tl;e boundaries of the regions recog~ised 
by the AU. The issue of regions and sub-
regions is already a complex and tricky 
one for continental governance with much 
overlapping, duplication, redundancy and 
ambiguity- in short, confusion. The PSC 
must be careful not to further complicate 
this issue. 
Article 17 deals with the PSC's 
relationship with the United Nations and 
other international organisations. With 
regard to the UN, the Article states that 
the PSC shall "co-operate and work closely 
with the United Nations Security Council" 
and that when necessary "recourse will be 
made to the United Nations to provide the 
necessary financial, logistical and military 
support" for the AU's peace and security 
activities. 
Article 21 deals with funding and 
provides for the establishment of a Peace 
Funu to provide financial resources for 
operational activities related to peace 
and security. In 2002, the UN Secretary-
General, Kofi Annan, estimated that it 
would cost a minimum of US$ 24 million 
to establish a 500 person force and the full 
peace and security agenda of the AU would 
cost approximately U$ 120 million over 
the first three years. 51 This is discussed in 
more detail in the section dealing with the 
operationalisation of the PSC. 
The PSC has been equipped with 
both the powers and the institutional 
mechanisms to perform its crucial role 
as the key operational structure of the 
peace and security architecture. Besides 
the operationalisation of the Protocol, 
which is dealt with in the next section, 
the effective operation of the PSC will be 
subject to two major challenges. The first 
relates to the relationship between the PSC 
and the Regional,Vlechanisms. Because 
51 Fldd, ed., Pr1zcc in Africa. Toward:> .r Coflabrmlfil'e ... , 
p.12. 
the PSC will have to rely on the conflict 
management activities and capabilities of 
rhe continent's sub regional bodies, and 
because the PSC's forces and capabilities are 
essentially the forces and capabilities which 
are drawn from the Regional Mechanisms, 
rhe relationship between the PSC and 
the Regional Mechanisms will need to be 
streamlined in order to remove duplication 
and overlaps. Unless this happens, there 
will be no rational distribution of tasks, 
functions and capabilities between the 
continental body and the regional bodies. 
The next challenge relates to the overarching 
issue mentioned above, namely the political 
will and commitment of the member states 
to make it work. 
The operationalisation of the PSC 
The operationalisation of the Protocol 
is a tremendous task that will not be 
accomplished in the short term. There 
are significant challenges to be overcome 
especially with regard to capacity, co-
ordination, the acquisition of the necessary 
capabilities and funding. 
Although the operationalisation of the 
PSC is still in its very early stages, the PSC 
has already begun conducting peace and 
security interventions. In order to find a 
solution to the contlict in Darfur, the PSC 
has been facilitating the "lnter-Sudanese 
Peace Talks in Abuja. In August 2004 the 
PSC deployed a mission to Darfur Sudan 
(AMIS)Y Between July and August 2005 
NATO transported approximately 2,000 
AU troops, including 49 members of the 
civilian police force, to Darfur. In October 
2005 residents of rhe Riyad refugee camp 
in Darfur reported that the AU forces 
monitoring the ceasefire in the region had 
not been doing enough to stop the violence 
against the approximately 15,000 refugees 
at the camp- militias were reported to have 
been beating residents and raping women 
with apparent impunity. Residents of the 
camp reported that AU troops had merely 
52 A!cx Vines, ;(\X'.tr and Peace, Arms and rhe Young 
Men", The Africa Report, nn.l Uvlay 2005): 60. 
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been "writing reports" and not protecting 
them. There appears to be an urgent need 
to disarm the Janjaweed, who have been 
attacking both residents and aid workers 
in the area. The British ~dinister for Africa 
David Triesman who visited Darfur in earlv 
October 2005, said that there was little . 
evidence that any of the militias had been 
disarmed and that disarming all sides was 
essential to stopping the violence.53 Despite 
considerable logisrical and financial support 
from the international community, the 
Darfur crisis has stretched the AU's capacity. 
The Darfur crisis is an important test case 
for the AU. According to Suliman Baldo, 
the Director of the Africa Program for the 
International Crisis Group, the AU should 
focus on succeeding in the Darfur test case 
before it embarks on any new peacekeeping 
missions. 54 
African Sta11dby Force (ASF) 
The Standby Force will be composed of a 
rapid deployment/early entry capability that 
can respond quickly in order to prevent 
mass killings or genocide while the mandate 
is prepared and approved for the follow-
on peacekeeping forces that make up the 
bulk of the stand by brigade. The need 
for a rapid deployment and early entry 
capability has been amply demonstrated by 
the slow reaction time of the United Nations 
to previous security crises in Africa, in 
particular the genocide in Rwanda.55 
The ASF will mainly be responsible 
for the following types of peace support 
operations: preventative diplomacy/ 
peacemaking, humanitarian intervention, 
peacekeeping, peace enforcement and 
peace building. It will also be able to 
conduct rapid response disaster and 
humanitarian relief operations. The idea is 
thar rhe Stand by Force should preferably be 
deployed in its own region bur that it can 
53 Rcutcrs wcbsite, 8 Ch:rober 2005 
54 Sulimnn Baldo, "Opinion", The Africa Report,no.l, 
.May 1005, p. 66. 
55 Helmoed-ROmcr Heitman, ''African Srandbv Force" 
Af'riwn Air Foro: Digest in \Vorld Air Nett'; (April 
2004), 65. 
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deploy outside of it tooc16 
In terms of the force design concept the 
five economic regions of Africa, the north, 
west, east, central and south, will each 
develop a balanced stand by brigade for the 
ASF and maintain that brigade at agreed 
levels of readiness. As indicated above, the 
boundaries of most of the regions have not 
yet been finalised. The 'working' outline of 
the boundaries is broadly based on the five 
major economic groupings that include the 
Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) and the Economic Community 
of West African States (ECOWAS). The 
countries in each of these regions will 
form a combined planning staff and a core 
regional brigade headquarters to prepare 
contingency plans, develop interoperability, 
undertake co-ordination and control 
deploymentY While the main headquarters 
and the central early warning centre will 
be in Addis Ababa, each region will also 
establish an early warning centre to monitor 
security developments and the possible 
need for humanitarian intervention. The 
combined planning staff and core regional 
brigade headquarters will, in liaison with 
the regional early warning centre, monitor 
security developments in the region. 
Each of the five brigades will comprise a 
number of units earmarked by the countries 
of rhe region for deployment with the 
brigades. Furthermore, each region will 
identify sufficient units and a balanced mix 
of units to allow its brigade to deploy in 
a form tailored to the demands of various 
types of missions. The brigade headquarters 
will establish a stand by roster to ensure 
that thev have a clear understanding of 
which units will be available at any given 
rime. This will mean that countries will be 
expected to earmark sufficient units to allow 
for training and stand-down rotations. 
The emphasis will be on light, mobile and 
sustained forces with an effective command 
56 Prescntmion to t!JL• Portfolio Committee 011 De(em·e 
,mdfnint St.wdiug Committee on !Jt!f~·ncc, the South 
African Department of Deft~ncc, 3 february 2004. 
57 Hcirman, "African Stand by 1-"nrcc", African Air Force 
/)igcsl ... : 65. 
and control capabi I ity.'" 
The Africa Standby Force (ASF) will be 
developed in two phases. In Phase 1 (by 30 
June 2005), the AU will develop a full time 
capacity for simpler missions and a standby 
system comprised of a skeleton mission 
HQ and stand by rosters. The five regions 
will begin to consider their standbv force 
elements. Decisions on support will need to 
be taken and the AU/regional doctrine and 
hierarchy of documents/procedures will be 
put in place and aligned with the UN. By the 
end of Phase 2 (by 30 June 2010) the ASF 
will be composed of five regional brigades 
and be capable of complex missions. Jackie 
Cilliers of the South African Institute for 
Security Studies believes that the proposal to 
establish five regional brigades is completely 
unrealistic: "If the AU thinks it is going to 
raise the funds for five standby brigades, it 
n1usr think again. " 59 
The ECOWAS brigade is based on 
the force groupings that were previously 
employed in the Ecomog operations in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone. With extensive 
operational experience in Liberia, Sierra 
Leone~ Guinea and Cote D'Ivoire, this 
sub-region is generally regarded as having 
an advantage over the other regions with 
respect to the creation of its standby force. 60 
The countries of ECOWAS, SADC and East 
Africa are currently involved in planning 
their stand by force elements. According 
to Brigadier-General Les Rudman, the 
South African Development Community 
(SAD C) met the deadline of June 30 for 
the first phase of preparations. An interim 
planning core for the SADC Brigade is in 
place and they were preparing to hand 
over to a permanent structure by December 
2005. l\1ember countries have pledged over 
6,000 troops and peace support doctrine 
has been completed. A logistical support 
system for the Brigade has been approved 
SH Helmocd-ROmer 1-lc-innan, ''African Standbv Force'', 
A(ricun Acrospaa and Dc{e11ce C.ltaloguc IAAD Cata-
logue) (September 2004): 19. 
59 "AU Wants Five African Peacc.kcl·ping Fortes", Thr: 
St.1r. 17 t--hy 2003 {Independent Online Somh Africa 
[onlinc 23 Jan 2006] 
60 Heitman, "'African Stand by Force", A(ric:m Air Force 
Digest ... : 65. 
and a financial management system has been 
designed. A memorandum of understanding 
for member states has been finalised and the 
region has held its first combined military 
exercise. Rudman said that by the end of 
2005 preparations should be sufficiently 
advanced for the Brigade to start stipulating 
its requirements to donors. "1 
G7jJacit)' reqttitemellts 
Over the past decade African forces have 
received peacekeeping training, or financial 
support for peacekeeping training, from 
a variety of sources including the G8, the 
United States, the United Kingdom, France, 
Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, 
Canada, Belgium, Germany, Italy, .Japan, 
The Netherlands and Portugal. Given 
such a multiplicity of sources for either 
peacekeeping training or support for 
peacekeeping training, there is an urgent 
need to standardise this training. This will 
have a direct impact on the interoperability 
of ASF forces. 
South African peacekeeping experience 
in the DRC has identified an urgent need 
to develop rhe capability for post-conllicr 
reconstruction or so-called developmental 
peacekeeping. Furthermore, Cheryl 
Hendricks of the Centre for Conllicr 
Resolution at the University of Cape 
Town has suggested rhar there should be 
a "conscious attempt to train \VOmen as 
k d k "&' peace eepers an peace-ma ers. -
Developing interoperability both with 
regard to communications and logistics 
is a key priority. The short-term focus is 
on communications at the tactical and 
operationallevels."3 Secure communications 
between the regional headquarters and 
the deploying countries' headquarters will 
also need to be developed. With regard ro 
rhe area of logistics, research needs to be 
undertaken to develop optimum levels of 
inter-operability with regard to fuel types, 
(1l '"SADC on Trilck with Peacekeeping Brig;lde"", Cape 
Times, 21 Septcmbt·r 2005:5. 
62 (nrerview with Cherd Hendricks 18 October 2004. 
63 Heinnan, "Afric,m St~mdby Force", A{ric,w AcrOS/J;1Cr 
,md Dl.'/t?JICC Clta!o,.;ue ... 
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aircraft fuelling systems, spares, technical 
support systems etc. 64 
The absence of an appropriate strategic 
and tactical airlift capability is a major 
weakness. Most of the inter-theatre and 
intra-theatre deployment and supply of 
forces will have to be by air. This is not 
only because of the requirement for an 
early entry capability bur also because the 
distances in Africa are vast and the overland 
transport infrastructure is generally very 
poor and in some cases non-existent.'"' The 
recent decision by South Africa to acquire 
between eight and fourteen Airbus A-400 
M strategic/tactical transport aircraft will, 
when they are delivered between 2010 and 
2014, go a long way to reducing if nor 
completely eliminating Africa's reliance 
on the major powers and charter aircraft 
for airlift support. In the medium to long-
term there will be a requirement for air-
transportable equi pmenr for the stand by 
brigades including combat and logisrical 
vehicles, field engineering vehicles and 
medical facilities. The development of a 
sealifr capacity for littoral operations may 
also become necessary in the medium to 
long term.6(> 
The capacity of the continental early 
warning system, the regional early warning 
systems and the capacity for planning 
and implementing peace missions will 
be greatly enhanced by the acquisition 
of advanced resources and procedures 
for collecting, assessing and distributing 
intelligence. Recent multi-national peace 
and security operations have demonstrated 
that these types of intelligence collection 
capabilities are necessary where there 
are fluid polirical and complex military 
situations. "Intelligence on the military 
power and disposition of forces, the location 
of minefields, rhe level of violence and 
other features in a deployment area are 
essential for planning and conducting peace 
64 !hid.: 19. 
65 Hdmoed-HOmer 1-!cirman, "S Africa to huy A400ivl". 
]mtc's Defence \Veek/y, 15 Dccembt·r 2004:4. 
66 Hcirm,m, "'African Smndby Force", Aji·icau Aerosp.zct~ 
~.md Defcuer: CatJlogue ... 19. 
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missions. " 67 In this regard the progressive 
acquisition of an airborne surveillance 
capability- beginning with the tactical 
level in the short-term and advancing to 
the regional level in the medium-term and 
then onro the continental level in the much 
longer term- will provide a major boost 
to the intelligence collection capabilities 
of the ASF. This could be achieved by a 
combination of unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAVs) and conventional aircraft.'~ 
In operationalising the PSC and building 
the ASF, South Africa is "expected to play 
a role commensurate with its strength 
as the major economic power south of 
the Sahara". 69 President Thabo Mbeki's 
energetic mediation efforts on the continent 
have given Sourh Africa a key role in almost 
every African peace agreement signed 
over the past live years, including those of 
Cote d'lvoire, Sudan, Burundi, the DRC, 
R wand a and The Comores. 70 The South 
African National Defence Force is now 
the largest contributor of peacekeeping 
troops in Africa. There are 3,000 South 
African troops deployed under UN and 
AU operations in the DRC (!viONUC 
Ill), Burundi, (Alv1IB/ONUB), Ethiopia 
(UNMEE), Eritrea (OLMEE), Sudan 
(AMIS), Liberia (UNMIL) and Uganda. 
The South African White Paper on Defence 
and the Defence Review is the subject of an 
67 Then Neethling, "'Conducting Operations in the Re.:dm 
of Peace and Security: Key issues and challenges in the 
African context,'' Small W'ars and lnsurgttncics, vol. 
14, no. 2 (Summer 2003}: 99. 
6.S South Africa .1lrcady manufactures and deploys a 
t.lctical UAV, "Seeker ll,.. and i::. in the process of 
developing a second generation Prcdamr--{:lass ~vledium 
Altitude Long Endur.mce (MALE) UAV ... Batclcur".lf 
the ASF deploys South Africa's current UAV surveil-
lance system, the "See\.:: er 2" it will be possible for 
rhe ASF ro achieve this capabi!lty in the short-term. 
Regional airborne survei!!ance capability could. In the 
medium term, be developed by combining the South 
African Bardcur UAV with a ,iep\oy,lbk C41 system. 
Thi~ would provide the ASF with a more cost effective 
version of Brazil's Amazon B.tsin Surveillance System 
(SIVAtv1), Hdmoed-R6mcr Heitman, "The Embracr 
approach ro Aerial Survt:illancc", Wtorfd Air N.:u•s 
(June 2004 ): 20. 
69 Garrh Shelton, "South Africa- Ddencc Transfonn.l-
rion and New Security Progress and Prospt.'ttS, ., SA! !A 
Reports, no. 35, Sourh African lnsrirurc of lnrcrna-
rional Affairs Uvtay 2003}: 35. 
70 Vines. "\X1ar and Peace ... ": 64. 
'update' process before the Parliamemary 
Portfolio Committee on Defence, which 
should be completed in 2007. The main 
thrust of this process is to align the 
SANDF's force design, force structure and 
capabilities with its new obligations under 
the AU and SADC. Once this process is 
complete, South Africa can be expected 
to play an even greater role. In this regard 
South Africa's advanced defence-industry 
sector can play a significant role in satisfying 
the future equipment needs of the AS F. 
Nigeria has been playing a very 
significant role in Ecomog and, as a long-
standing advocate of the new continental 
peace and security architecture, it can be 
expected ro play an even greater role in 
future. However, in the medium term, the 
AU, even with a commensurate commitment 
from South Africa and Nigeria, will not be 
able to develop the necessary peacekeeping 
capabilities and fund the necessary 
peacekeeping operations without western 
support. 
The Role of the West and the 
international community 
Since the United States' withdrawal from 
Somalia and particularly since the genocide 
in Rwanda there has been a proliferation 
of mainly Western initiatives aimed at 
supporting African efforts in the area of 
peacekeeping. In 1996 the United States 
established the African Crisis Response 
Initiative (ACRI) to build a peacekeeping 
and humanitarian assistance capacity 
in Africa. Before being replaced by the 
African Contingency Operations Training 
and Assistance Programme (ACOTA) in 
July 2002, A CRI had trained more than 
8,600 soldiers from African militaries in 
peacekeeping tactics." ACOTA is intended 
to bolster Africa's indigenous peacekeeping 
capability by providing training and 
equipment. The administration's Financial 
71 Mark ~Lthm. "New Tools in the Box? Towards a 
Standby force for rhe AlJ", Pcdcc ill Africa: Totl',mls 
,; Coll.:dmratil'£' Secmity Regime, cd. Shannon field 
(Johannesburg: lmrirurc for Global Dialogue, 2004 ), p. 
205. 
Year 2003 budget request to Congress for 
US$ 10 million reflects a low prioritisation 
of this programme and the spiralling cost 
of the war in !rag will probably mean that 
African peace and security issues will not 
be a budget priority of the Penragon for 
the foreseeable future. The attractiveness 
of the A COT A programme is not enhanced 
by the US request for access to rudimentary 
bases- ~'co-operative security locations" 
-in Africa for training and possible use for 
operations during crises. 72 
On the other hand, the US launched the 
East African counter-terrorism initiative 
with a budget of US$ 100 million to 
increase the regional counter-terrorism 
capacities of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Kenva, Tanzania and Uganda.73 In 2003, 
the United States' deployment of marines 
to Liberia helped lead to the resignation of 
President Taylor and the establishment of 
the UN peacekeeping force to supervise the 
transition. 
The United Kingdom has been operating 
British Military Advisory and Training 
Teams (BMATTS) in African countries 
under the UK's African Peacekeeping 
Training Support Programme. The 
Programme aims to provide peacekeeping 
training to officers from African countries. 
The budget for the financial years 2001 to 
2003 was about US$ 100 million per year.74 
In 1996 France established Recamp 
- the reinforcement of African military 
capabilities for peacekeeping programme. 
This programme provided, inter alia, 
for the creation of a training centre for 
peacekeeping in the Ivory Coast and the pre-
positioning of equipment for peacekeeping 
battalions. The Recamp budget has been 
reasonablv stable, with 3 million Euros 
being allocated in 2000.75 
There have been a number of otber 
bilateral initiatives which focus on the 
72. Andrew Koch, ''US is now set ro turn the focus on Af-
rican Security.,,jmwS Dc{encu Weekly, 21 April20U4: 
6. 
73 F<Hia, "Crisis Jvlamgemenr in Sub-Saharan Africa ... ": 
24. 
74 ,\la !an, New Tools in the Box ... ": 203. 
75 Ibid.: 203. 
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following: supporting the UN, regional 
and sub regional missions in Africa; direct 
financial assistance to African regional 
and sub regional organisations; supporting 
or assisting in peacekeeping training 
for African forces; financial, logistics 
or equipment support to peacekeeping 
training exercises in Africa; mediation; and 
conflict prevention initiatives by African 
civil society organisations.7(' Numerous 
coumries have been involved in these types 
of initiatives including Norway, Denmark, 
Sweden, Finland, Canada, The Netherlands, 
Germany, Italy, Belgium and Japan. Norway 
is financing a five-year training project for 
peace in Southern Africa, aimed at building 
capacity for conflict management and 
peacekeeping. The project focuses on the 
civilian and political aspect of peacekeeping, 
civil-military relations and specialised 
training for civilian police. Denmark has, 
inter alia, built peacekeeping training 
facilities and provided courses on defence 
management for southern African forces. 
With regard to mediation, Norway has been 
active in the Sudan peace process77 
In December 2003 the EU established the 
Peace Facility For Africa ro support African 
led operations and build the long-term 
capacity of African institutions ro carry our 
such operations. The proposed budget for 
2004 was 250 million Euros. Further, the 
EU launched operation Arremis in Bunia in 
the DRC in 2003.78 
NATO 
As mentioned above, the UN Secretary 
General and the AU asked NATO to assist 
the AU with its operation in Darfur. NATO 
provided support to AiV1IS in the form of 
strategic airlift and training. During 2005 
NATO airlifted over 2,800 AU troops and 
provided staff capacity-building workshops 
for African Union officers engaged in the 
Darfur operation. The training covered 
76 Faria, "'Crisis .Management in Sub-Saharan Africa ... -: 
25-2.6. 
77 Ibid.: 25-26. 
78 Ulriksen, Gourby and :vlace, ··Operation Arremis .. .'': 
522. 
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command and control procedures, reporting 
systems, battle rhythm, intelligence 
c;JIIection and analysis, force generation, 
situational awareness, and task force and 
headquarters standard operating procedures 
refinement. More than 100 AU officers 
completed the NATO training workshops. 79 
NATO also provided 14 officers in 
support of a training exercise organised 
by the UN Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations for the Ai'vi!S force headquarters 
in El Fashir, Sudan. In this regard NATO 
provided exercise and operations-plan 
writers, as well as tactical-level controllers. 
The object of the exercise was to enhance 
the AU's ability to operate in the dynamic 
humanitarian scenario in Darfur. At this 
stage, there is no agreement between NATO 
and the AUto provide ongoing support for 
AU operations.'" 
There are three main areas of criticism 
of Western initiatives to develop African 
peacekeeping capabilities. The first 
criticism deals with the issue of co-
ordination. The OAU expressed concern 
that the uncoordinated nature of the 
various prugrmnmes could detract from 
the abilirv of the member states and the 
OAU M;chanism to undertake effective 
peacekeeping operations." This criticism 
still holds true today. The second criticism 
deals with the linkage between capacity 
building and capacity utilisation; namely 
that it is not clear whether the training 
and/or the equipment makes African 
recipients more willing or able to undertake 
peacekeeping operations on the continent. 
In other words, training should not be 
conducted for its own sake, and the 
equipment that is provided should be 
standardised and should match the real 
needs of the recipient countries." The next 
criticism relates to funding, as regards both 
quantum and duration. The EU's Peace 
Facility for Africa appears to be a very 
7lJ ;.NATO cominues to offer Logistical Support to 
African Union"', SIMpe News, 6 October 2005 (NATO 
fonline 23 Jan 2006]). 
81) Ibid. 
SI ~hlan, ''New Tools in a Box ... ": 207. 
S2 Ibid.: 208. 
significant step in the right direction. The 
important questions will be how it is spent, 
for how long it is provided and whether or 
not other countries are prepared to increase 
their donor assistance to the development of 
African peacekeeping capabilities. 
How the \X'est goes about assisting the 
African Union to acquire the necessary 
capabilities and to conduct peace support 
operations will determine the course of 
the emerging security relationship between 
Africa and the West. For this relationship 
to succeed it will need to be a true strategic 
partnership based on mutually-agreed 
modalities including objectives, co-ordinated 
assistance, appropriate and sustainable 
funding and accountability. 
TheGS 
As mentioned before, ever since the 
Kananaskis Summit in 2002 the G8 has 
been actively supporting African efforts to 
achieve and consolidate peace and security 
throughout Africa. At the G8 Gleneagles 
Summit in 200S the GS agreed to provide 
extra resources to Africa's peacekeeping 
forces. In terms of this, the G8 would help 
Africa to raise up to 2S,OOO extra trained 
peacekeeping troops. This is in addition to 
the 7S,OOO AU troops by 2010 that the GS, 
at Sea Island in 2004, committed itself to 
training and, where appropriate, equipping. 
At the Gleneagles Summit, the GS also 
committed itself to providing, inter alia, the 
following assistance to the AU for conflict 
resolution, peacekeeping, post conflict 
reconstruction and anti-terrorism activities: 
• Co-ordinated technical assistance to the 
ASF in helping to establish planning 
elements at the AU headquarters and its 
regional brigades 
• Developing the AU's ability to deploy 
unarmed military observer missions, 
civilian policing operations and 
Gendanneri/Carabinieri-like forces 
as part of its stabilisation and peace 
support operations 
• Support, including flexible funding 
for African peacekeeping operations 
covering transport, logistics and 
financial management capacity 
• Countering terrorism in Africa 
including co-operation with the AU's 
anti-terrorism centre in Algiers 
• Resources for the AU and its sub-
regional organisations to develop the 
planned continental early warning 
system, implement the Panel of the 
Wise and conflict mediation 
• Enhancing the capabilities of the 
AU and sub-regional organisations 
by promoting more effective and 
flexible crisis response mechanisms 
and promoting faster and more 
comprehensive and co-ordinated 
partner responses between GS 
countries, the UN, key regional 
organisations and other partners 
• Improving the ability of the AUto 
collect and destroy illicit small arms 
• Reconstruction and reconciliation in 
post-conflict countries by providing, 
where appropriate, rapid and flexible 
mulrilateral and bilateral debt relief for 
post-conflict countries and allocating 
grant financing for reconstruction, 
disarmament, demobilisation and 
reintegration into civilian life for 
former combatants 
• The urgent improvement of timelines 
and the predictability, effectiveness 
and availability of humanitarian 
assistance.83 
The United Nations 
The UN is currently involved in six 
peacekeeping operations in Africa, namely: 
• Western Sahara I MINURSO 
• DRC-MONUC 
• Burundi- ONUB 
• Sierra Leone- NUAMSIL 
• Cored' lvoire- UNOCI 
• Ethiopia and Eritrea - UNMEE 
Out of its total (record-breaking) 
peacekeeping budget of $3,180,743,200 
83 Africa, Glene,1gles 200.5 Summit Documents (2005), 
pp. 2-5, CS Glcm•,wl!!s 2005 (GS Presidency !online 
10 ]an 2006]). 
IFS Info 1/2006 25 
for 2005-2006, the UN is spending 
$1,445,152,200, or 45%, on its African 
peacekeeping operarions.84 
New partnership for Africa's 
development (NEPAD) 
To give substance to the African Renaissance 
vision, President Mbeki developed a detailed 
aid plan called the 1\clillennium Africa 
Recovery Plan (MAP). Soon after the MAP 
was released, the President of Senegal 
Abdoulaye Wade launched the Omega 
plan. These two plans were merged and 
synthesised imo the New African Initiative 
(NAI), which after consultations with 
Nigeria, Egypt and Algeria evolved into the 
New Partnership for Africa's Development 
(Nepad). Nepad was adopted by the OAU in 
July 2001 and it was subsequently mandated 
as the key development programme of the 
OAU. 
Nepad provides both the opportunity 
and the framework for the renewal of the 
relationship between African states and 
their development partners in the industrial 
world. It does so by establishing principles 
and mechanisms to facilitate the following: 
support for countries who reform; the 
co-ordination of donor activities; the 
performance monitoring of donor practices; 
the complementariness of aid, trade, 
debt relief and investment; and mutual 
accountability. Nepad was presented to 
the GB Leaders at the Kananaskis Summit 
in 2002 where it was well received. The 
GS's Africa Action Plan (AAP) which 
was adopted at the Kananaskis Summit 
is the GS's initial response to Nepad and 
is designed to encourage the "imaginative 
effort that underlies the Nepad and to lay a 
solid foundation for fmure co-operation" .85 
Nepad identifies peace, security, 
democracy, political governance, economic 
and corporate governance, and regional co-
operation and integration as preconditions 
84 ''UN Peacekeeping Opcr,Hions. Background Note 
Ocrober 1005" (United Nations [unline 23 jan 2006]). 
85 2002 GS Afri.:a Acti(m Plan, 2001 Kananaskis Summir 
Documcms (17 June 2002), C.m.tda's G8 Wleb.;;itt! 
(Government of C.uuda [online 10 Jan 1006]). 
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for development. Although Nepad is 
primarily concerned with socio-economic 
development and is therefore not, per se, 
a se~:urity programme, it does contain a 
peace and security initiative. This initiative 
consists of three elements: 
• Promoting the long-term conditions for 
development and security; 
• Building the capacity of African 
institutions for early warning, as well 
as enhancing rhe capacity of African 
institutions to prevent, n1anage and 
resolve conflicts; 
• Institutionalising commitment to the 
core values of the African initiative 
through leadership."' 
Nepad focuses efforts to build the capacity 
of the continental and regional institutions 
to manage all aspects of conAicts on four 
key areas, namely: 
• Preventing, managing and resolving 
conAict; 
• Peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace 
enforceinent; 
• Post-conAict reconcilicltion, 
rehabilitation and reconstruction; 
• Taking action to counter the illicit 
proliferation of small arms, light 
weapons and landmines. ' 7 
Nepad also includes the African Peer Review 
Mechanism (APRM) which is an instrument 
voluntarily acceded to by member states 
of the AU as an African self-monitoring 
mechanism. This involves African 
governments agreeing to performance 
standards and criteria in the economic and 
political governance arenas." The APRM 
aims to promore good governance which, 
in terms of Nepad, is regarded as a tool for 
dealing with the root causes of conAict. By 
October 2004, 23 of the 53 AU member 
86 New African Initiarivc (NAI), Hcnning Melber, "The 
New Afr:can Initiative and /\fric.1n Union", Currellt 
A(rimn f.:;~ w:;, no.25, Nordiska Afrikn lnstituret 
(2001): Appendix 1, p. 18. 
R7 IbiJ. p. IS. 
88 Srcvcn Gdb, "Nepad- a Brief 0\·crview, Global 
Insight, the Focus on Current lssucs",/ssue, no. 19, In-
stitute for Global Dialogue, Johannesburg (June 2002): 
3. 
states had signed up for scrutiny. In 2005 
Ghana and Rwanda completed their review 
processes and Mauritius, Kenya and South 
Africa commenced their review processes. 
The conference on security, stability, 
development and co-operation in Africa 
(CSSDCA) 
The CSSDCA, historically a Nigerian 
initiative, is heavily influenced by the 
Organisation for Security and Co-operation 
in Europe (OSCE). As indicated above, the 
OAU and the UN Economic Commission 
for Africa jointly sponsored a conference 
in Kampala in 1991 under the framework 
of the African Leadership Forum. The final 
report of this conference, the "The Kampala 
Document", proposed the establishment 
of a permanent Conference on SecuritY, 
Stability, Development and Co-operation. 
This document called, inter alia, for the 
establishment of a continental peacekeeping 
machinery. This theme was to have a 
major influence on the establishment of the 
OAU conAict management mechanism in 
1993." In July 2000 the OAU adopted the 
declaration on the Ministerial Conference 
on Security, Stability, Development and 
Co-operation in Africa. In July 2002 rhe 
inaugural summit of the AU adopted the 
Memorandum of Understanding on Security, 
Stabiliry, Development and Co-operation 
in Africa. In terms of this memorandum 
the CSSDCA became part of the work 
programme of the AU. The AU currently 
characterises it as "a policy development 
process created to function within the 
framework of the African Union".'" Like 
Nepad, the CSSDCA is a Special Programme 
of the AU. 
The preamble to the above-mentioned 
memorandum emphasises the inter-
dependence of security and srability on one 
hand and development and co-operation 
on the other. In terms of this memorandum, 
g9 Espegrcn. ''The Organisation of African Unity ... ": 
26-27. 
90 "Special Programs"/"CSSDCA", A(ricun U11ion web-
site {[onlinc 10 .Jan 1006]). 
member states have committed themselves 
to subscribe to 24 core values and a detailed 
and comprehensive list of commitments to 
give effect to the core values. Core values 
include: the sovereignty of every African 
state; the centrality of peace and security 
to the development of both individuals 
and the state; good governance, including 
accountability, transparency and the rule of 
law. 
Two of the most important commitments 
are the development of a collective 
continental architecture for promoting 
security and inter-African relations and the 
adopti;)n of a comprehensive response for 
the prevention and resolution of conflicts. 
Section Ill of the memorandum 
contains the key performance indicators 
for evaluating compliance with the above-
mentioned commitments. Parr A of this 
section contains the key performance 
indicators for security which include: the 
establishment of a cr;mmon definition of 
security based on the concept of human 
security and establishing the mechanisms for 
implen;enting the provisions of Articles 4 (h) 
and 4 (j) of the CAAU. 
Part B of the Section Ill contains the key 
performance indicators for stability. Part 
C contains the key performance indicators 
for development and part D the key 
performance indicators for co-operation. 
Like Nepad, the CSSDCA is premised on 
the comprehensive interlinkage of security, 
development, human rights and democracy. 
There is a significant convergence and 
overlap between the core values and 
commitments of the CSSDCA and the 
principles and objectives of the CAAU, 
the PSC and Nepad. Like Nepad, the 
CSSDCA has its own unit bur it is unclear 
to what degree this unit has been integrated 
with the administration of the AU. The 
main difference between the CSSDCA, 
the CAAU, the PSC and Nepad is that its 
key performance indicators specify strict 
deadlines and/or targets which continental 
institutions, regional institutions and 
member states have to meet in order to be in 
compliance with the commitments that they 
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have undertaken under the memorandum of 
understanding. As with Nepad, the AU also 
intends in future to fully incorporate and 
integrate the CSSDCA processes into AU 
structures and processes. 
Conclusion 
The CAAU, the PSC, Nepad and the 
CSSDCA are the four pillars of Africa's 
new continental peace and security 
architecture. Collectively, these instruments 
and programmes provide the values, 
norms, principles, objectives, institmions, 
mechanisms, procedures and performance 
indicators of the new continental security 
framework, which is the basis for a 
collective security system in Africa. These 
insrrnments and programmes are all 
predicated on the acknowledgement that 
peace, security, democracy and political 
governance are essential preconditions for 
social and economic development. This is 
a fundamentally different approach to that 
taken by the OAU, especially over the first 
30 years of its existence. 
The AU and the PSC have appropriated 
the powers that the OAU and its Mechanism 
lacked, most critically the right to intervene 
in a member state. This right has weakened 
the principle of non-interference in the 
internal affairs of a member state and to 
that extent it has qualified sovereignty. 
The relationship between the AU 
and the Regional Mechanisms is a very 
complex one. In this regard it is entirely 
appropriate for Article 16 of the PSC to 
stress harmonisation, co-ordination and 
effective partnerships. An important part of 
this will be the degree to which the AU and 
rhe Regional Mechanisms agree to a rational 
and streamlined distribution of tasks and 
functions between the continental and 
regional levels. 
The relationship between the CAAU 
and the PSC on one hand and Nepad and 
the CSSDCA on the other will eventually 
need to be settled. This is not an urgent 
issue because the relationships between 
the instruments and the programmes is a 
complementary one and the overlapping 
and duplication occurs in the area of 
values, principles, norms, objectives and 
policies and not on the institutional and 
enforcement terrain. It is intended that 
Nepad and the CSSDCA will eventually be 
fully incorporated into and integrated with 
the AU. In the meantime, the relative non-
incorporation of these programmes might 
be an asset because they could function as 
oversight nodes for monitoring the integrity 
and performance of the PSC in particular 
and the AU in general. This 'oversight' 
function could also serve as a qualified and 
somewhat informal antidote to the lack of 
accountability of the Assembly. 
Nepad and the CSSDCA, with their 
human security approach, are predicated on 
a more comprehensive approach to security 
than the collective security approach of the 
AU. 91 When the norms and values of Nepad 
and the CSSDCA become embedded in the 
AU it will be interesting to observe whether 
this results in the AU developing a more 
comprehensive approach to security that 
includes the notion of human security. 
Between the adoption by the AU 
of the Declaration on the Political and 
Socio-Economic Situation in Africa and 
the Fundamental Changes Taking Place 
in the World on 11 July 1990 and the 
entering into force of the Protocol relating 
to the Establishment of the Peace and 
Security Council of the African Union on 
26 December 2003, African leaders have 
developed, adopted and begun implementing 
a new continental governance regime. At the 
heart of this lies the management of peace 
and security on the continent. In this regard, 
a fundamental shift has taken place because 
African leaders have empowered the AU 
ro play the kind of role that the OAU was 
never empowered to play. 
Donor assistance is a sine qua non for the 
91 A human security approach c111phasises tlut the .secu-
rity of Individuals and nor the security of stares should 
be the main reicrcnce for security (Gavin Cawthra, 
~A Conceptual Framework for Regional Security" 
in Peact! in Alric,1. Tow.trds ;1 Coi/,Jbor.Jfii!C Secunty 
Rc<gime, ed. Shannon Fields (Johannesburg: Institute 
for Global Di,1logue, 2004 ), p. 30. 
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operationalisation of the PSC. In this regard 
quite significant funds are alreadv available. 
Additional, predictable and sust~inable 
levels of funding will be required. However, 
it is equally important for donor assistance 
to be co-ordinated both between donors 
themselves and between donors and the 
African Union. This should ensure that 
the appropriate level of funding is made 
available to the appropriate programme 
at the correct time and in such a wav 
that it produces the desired outcom~ and 
contributes to the overall development of 
African peacekeeping capabilities and the 
implementation of African peacekeeping 
operations. 
In the relatively short period of time 
between 2002 and 2005 African and 
Western leaders have taken significant 
strides towards the development of a true 
strategic partnership which, if properly 
managed, nurtured and developed, can and 
indeed should over the medium to long 
term produce a win-win relationship. Since 
2002 Africans have instituted and begun 
to operationalise the AU, PSC and Nepad. 
These developments demonstrate substantial 
political will and commitment bv African 
leaders to adopt and to implement a new 
continental peace and security regime. In the 
same timeframe, Western leaders in response 
to these African developments and in 
particular Nepad, have instituted, inter alia, 
the G8's Africa Action Plan at Kananaskis in 
2002 and the EU's Peace Facility for Africa 
in 2003. In addition to this, they have also 
committed extra resources to peace and 
security and developmenr in Africa at the 
GS Gleneagles Summit in 2005. These are 
some of the key indications that, while it 
is as yet early days, the emerging security 
relationship between Africa and the West 
is moving steadily and quite rapidly in the 
right direction. 
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